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Abstract. The project Deconstructive Evaluation of Risk In Dependability Arguments and Safety
Cases (DERIDASC) has recently experimented with techniques borrowed from literary theory as
safety case analysis techniques (Armstrong & Paynter 2003, Armstrong 2003).  This paper
introduces our high-level method for “deconstructing” safety arguments. Our approach is quite
general and should be applicable to different types of safety argumentation framework. As one
example, we outline how the approach would work in the context of the Goal Structure Notation
(GSN).
1. Introducing Deconstruction
Initially, “deconstruction” can be understood as an umbrella term for the work of the French
philosopher Jacques Derrida. Our everyday idea of language tends to assume that the relationships
between signifiers (symbols, icons, words) and signifieds (referents, ideas, and meanings) that we
habitually exploit are reliable; but Derrida’s work departs from the idea that our intuition that signifiers
“stand for” well-understood signified referents, ideas, or meanings is riddled with difficulties and
inconsistencies. In effect, Derrida suggests that effects of meaning are purely associative and that the
ways in which associations accrue to signifiers are (in principle) unboundedly indeterminate. Thus we
will never quite escape the possibility that differences of interpretation will emerge, even where we
express our arguments in formal logic: after all, formal logic would be quite useless if we could not
make informal interpretations of it; but the reliability of our informal interpretations is undermined by
indeterminacy of meaning. Among the more notorious implications that Derrida derives from his
theory of meaning is the view that all distinctions are enforced by linguistic convention, rather than
being faithful reflections of existent boundaries. He also argues that the rigorous examination of
distinctions inevitably reveals that, in the final analysis, they fail to “distinguish”, and partly construct
the “opposites” that they supposedly describe neutrally.
In the context of this paper, we are less interested in Derrida’s theory of indeterminacy of meaning
(our previous papers cover these issues in more detail) and more interested in how he has exploited it in
his approach to the analysis of philosophical arguments. Derrida’s method for deconstruction rests
upon the idea that, ironically enough, the meaning of an argument is a function of observations that it
excludes as irrelevant and the perspectives that it opposes either implicitly or explicitly. To argue a
conclusion we make use of mental models of our “opponents”. Where we are genuinely unaware of
possibilities for opposing views we are unlikely to feel much need to express ourselves; yet
dissociating ourselves from an opposing viewpoint is a risky operation. On the one hand, if we
recognise an opposing argument explicitly, we might be tempted to misrepresent it as weaker than we
really feel it to be; but if this misrepresentation is detected, or if our own arguments do not convince,
we may succeed only in perpetuating the opposing view. On the other hand, if we try to suppress our
acknowledgment of credible doubt, we leave the reader mystified as to why we feel the need to argue
our conclusion.
Deconstruction has two stages. The reversal stage develops a counter-argument from clues offered
within the original argument; the displacement stage compares the two arguments and tries to move the
debate forward in some positive sense. Admittedly, “displacement” is more difficult than Derrida’s
adherents are prepared to admit; but in this paper we suggest that in a safety assessment context it
involves reassessment of the existing safety acceptance criteria. The “deconstruction” of an argument
2tries to show how it undercuts itself with acknowledgements of plausible doubts about its conclusion
and betrays a nervous desire for the truth of the conclusion rather than unshakeable confidence. To test
this hypothesis on a safety argument, we have found that we require a framework in which mutually
contradictory arguments can be expressed, explored, and compared.
Section 2 discusses our interpretation of deconstruction as an exploration of the lack of “closure”
that is inherent in any non-absolute argument. In Section 3, we develop this idea into a logical schema
in which the justifiability of an argument and a counter-argument can be compared. We use the schema
to explain why acting upon “sufficiently justified” beliefs, as safety assessors do when they accept or
reject safety-critical systems, always involves some degree of self-contradiction. Sections 4 and 5
describe heuristics for the reversal and displacement stages of deconstruction in the context of safety
assessment and Section 6 applies our approach to an example safety argument.
2. Safety Argument Deconstruction: An Overview
A safety argument has to be inferentially valid in some sense – either deductively, in the case of a
logical inference, or inductively in the case of a step in probabilistic reasoning. In both cases,
conclusions must follow from premises by explicit rules. Furthermore to compel conviction an
argument must be “sound”: its premises must be true. It is generally agreed to be philosophically
untenable to assume that any empirical observation is irrefutable. The requirement for total soundness
in an empirical argument merely leads to a pervasive scepticism about all belief. Hence it is generally
conceded that empirical premises of an argument must be justified in such a way that they seem very
plausible. To justify empirical claims as knowledge supporting evidence is required.  In logics of
justified belief, premises can be “warranted” to differing degrees; for example, Toulmin (1958) argues
that “warrants” for belief require backing evidence and that this evidence can vary in strength.
In the reversal stage of safety argument deconstruction we ignore the warrantedness of the premises
in the original argument: instead, we try to produce a counter-argument that seems warrantable. Hence
we provisionally assume that we could find sufficient evidence for justified belief in our counter-
argument. In the displacement stage we deal with the relative strength of the warrants and backing
evidence for both argument and counter-argument. Hopefully, after reversal we will be able to see that
one argument (or both) is (are) unsatisfactory and act accordingly (either accept the system or require
more work on it). However, there is a possibility that we get two opposing arguments that are
“sufficiently” warranted. Our deconstructive approach must recognise this possibility of lack of
“closure”. It follows from an inherent limit of the principle of deductive closure that supports
inferences from non-absolute but justified beliefs. We will further explicate this limit below, but
essentially the argument is as follows: if the justification of a belief is not absolute, it is necessarily
possible that there is an equally or more justifiable argument for the opposite belief; since this
possibility is necessary, it cannot be logically discounted; therefore, we can never really know what
level of warrant we ought to require for the original statement: the best we can attain is a “belief in the
sufficiency of our justified belief” that is justifiable insofar as the inability to find equally good or
better counter-arguments is genuine.
The “blindspots” that disturb the sense of closure in arguments are not necessarily hard to locate.
For example, consider a simple coin toss as modelled in probability theory. Suppose we have assessed
the probability of heads or tails as 0.5. The sense of “closure” in this idealised model is easy to disturb
with empirical evidence: unreadability of the outcome is empirically possible (e.g. the coin is lost). If
the model simply excludes this possibility, then the meaning of assertions that the probabilities of
heads and tails is 0.5 is thrown into question. For example, the idea that the probability of tails is
simply 1 – P(heads) and vice versa is problematised. Of course, we could try to improve our
probability estimates by collecting contextual and empirical data (e.g. modelling the context in which
the coin will be tossed, making measurements of the distribution of weight in the coin); but in practice
we will have give up measuring eventually and thus exclude “irrelevant” factors. To question the
“closure” of an argument is to try and find something that has been excluded but which when re-
introduced undermines faith in the argument by suggesting a good counter-argument.
33. The Questioning of Deductive Closure
To have any force, a safety argument must really consist of an argument and a “meta-argument”.
The argument says that from a certain set of premises P1,…, Pn, the conclusion C follows. The
conclusion might consist of a number of claims C1,…, Cn but we will assume a single conclusion for
simplicity. We will use deductive validity as the interpretation of “follows” for now, but we do not
mean this to be taken too literally: we expect that any kind of inference rule could be used – including
rules that allow exceptions, such as Toulmin’s (1958) “warrants” with their backing evidence and
qualifiers. Thus our safety arguments will be of the form:
P1,…, Pn  |–  C
Since deductive validity does not guarantee that the inference is sound, the argument must also
justify belief in each premise. For now we will not worry about the strength of this justification. Thus
the argument being offered is equivalent to:
SA justified(P1),…, justified(Pn) |–  justified(C)
To have the force that it has, the argument needs to claim that because the premises are justified and
the conclusion follows from them, then the conclusion is also justified. There is usually a constraint on
the strength of the justification. We shall consider this matter presently.
The principle relied upon to make inferences of warranted beliefs from warranted premises is called
the Deductive Closure Principle (DCP). As Olin (2003, p.83) expresses it:
Deductive Closure Principle (DCP). If you are justified in believing P1,…, Pn and P1,…, Pn jointly
imply Q, and you see this, then you are justified in believing Q.
Olin gives several reasons why this principle is more problematic than it first appears. Her
observations relate to the “lottery paradox”. In this paradox, we hold a ticket in a thousand-ticket
lottery. We know one ticket will win. We assess the probability against winning as 999/1000 and
decide that this level of probability justifies us in believing we will not win: but our ticket is just like all
the others, and our inference is therefore equally justified for all other tickets; which would mean that
no ticket would win. So if we made an inference that we would not win we would implicitly be
accepting contradictory propositions (Olin 2003). DERIDASC drew analogous conclusions from a
consideration of the underlying logic of acting upon justified beliefs, which is the basis of the safety
process.
No doubt the observations about the indeterminacy of meaning in deconstruction cause even more
problems for argumentation than Olin finds: if premises are ambiguous in any way, they cannot be
warranted. If the conclusion is ambiguous, it is not clear that it is warranted even where the premises
are. Indeterminacies of meaning in predicates would make logical consistency and deductive validity
impossible to assess. Thus, we believe that relative determinacy of meaning – since according to
Derrida, this is all we are ever going to attain – should be a necessary precondition for the justifiability
of a statement. However, in this section, we simply assume that determinacy of meaning can be
verified: even when we do so, consideration of DCP leads to a variant of the lottery paradox that
applies to the notion of a “sufficiency” of confidence in a defeatable statement, such as a safety claim.
Note the words “and you see this” in DCP: Derrida’s deconstruction is concerned with what
happens when one sees “this” but does not see what is opposed to “this”. It suggests that we ask what
the opposite of “justified” could be. The answer “unjustified” yields a problem: “unjustified” does not
mean the same as “unjustifiable”. All “justified” means is that a good justification for a statement has
been constructed. All “unjustified” means is that no good justification has been offered so far.
Ironically, a claim of “unjustifiability” would be itself unjustifiable in the context we are considering:
in denying the possibility of justification to a given statement, “unjustifiability” makes an implicit
appeal to the absolute truth of the negation of that statement. We are trying to minimise reliance on
such appeals; yet we cannot assert the “unjustifiability” of an assertion where, to avoid the charge of
scepticism, all reasoning has been put on non-absolute grounds. However, we will provisionally adhere
to the common-sense view that logical contradictions are unjustifiable.
4DERIDASC found a number of problems with DCP as Olin (2003) formulates it. Firstly, it is not
clear whether “implies” means material implication, and whether if it does we are to believe that the
inference P1,…, Pn implies Q is itself justified. Secondly, since false implies every statement, DCP can
be used to deduce belief in contradictions from contradictory premises. We fix these problems by
requiring that the set of premises P1,…, Pn be satisfiable (their conjunction is logically consistent) and
that there must be a deductive argument from them to the conclusion in question:
Strengthened Deductive Closure Principle (SDCP). Given:
a) a set of premises P1,…, Pn
b) a justification for each premise in P1,…, Pn
c) an argument that P1,…, Pn is a satisfiable set of premises
d) that P1,…, Pn  |– Q is a deductively valid inference
e) and one sees this,
then one is justified in believing Q.
Below we develop a “deconstructive” schema for dialectical argument that allows different levels of
confidence to be assigned to a statement. We follow Toulmin (1958) in allowing that what he calls a
“warrant” – an inference rule – itself needs to be justified. It can be strengthened by backing evidence
or weakened by data about exceptions. Thus confidence in a justification is a matter of degree. Rather
than introduce backing as a separate term, we define the level of confidence in a justification as a
function ω that maps the claimed statement to a value n where 0 ≤  n ≤  1. We refer to this as the
warrantedness of the statement. Warrantedness can be absolute or zero, so that we can include total
certainties and unwarranted statements should they be claimed.
We also need to be able to record how far the deductive argument itself is warranted.  For example,
we might use a proof tool to do a deduction, and have some worries about its reliability; or if the
derivation is long and complex, we might have doubts about our own capability to check it. If we
accept such possibilities, we have to adopt a logically weakened version of SDCP:
Warranted Deduction Schema (WDS). Suppose we have:
a) a set of premises P1,…, Pn
b) a degree of warrant ω, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1, for each of P1,…, Pn
c) an argument that sat(P1,…, Pn), i.e. we have a satisfiable set of premises
d) a deductively valid inference P1,…, Pn  |– Q
e) a degree of warrant ω for the argument in (c)
f) a degree of warrant ω for the deduction in (d)
then we are justified in believing ω(Q), where this is defined as:
ω(Pi) × ω(sat(P1,…, Pn)) × ω( P1,…, Pn  |– Qi)
where ω(Pi) is the minimum of the warrants in b): min({ x | x = ω(Pj) for all j in 1 .. n })
Note that a consequence of WDS is that a zero degree of warrant for any statement or deduction
immediately nullifies the degree of warrant for the conclusion. The derivation of a certainty would
require all statements and deductions to be certain. In bounding confidence in our argument by the least
warranted premise, we have adopted a conservative approach. We do not allow that the mutual
consistency of premises can increase confidence in the set as a whole. However, we recognise that
“coherentist” epistemologists would argue for this (Everitt & Fisher 1995, Chapter 7); we could adopt
such an approach without changing our analysis of the problems involved in the idea of a sufficiency of
confidence.
A theory of inductive justification requires the idea of a sufficient degree of warrant that justifies
belief in a defeatable statement. This is analogous to a basic presupposition of probabilistic reasoning
that the lottery paradox puts into question (see Olin 2003, p. 79):
Principle of Sufficient Warrant (PSW).
There exists a degree of warrant Ω, such that 0.5 < Ω ≤ 1, and such that if statement P has warrant
ω(P) ≥ Ω, then we are justified in believing that P.
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Ω(P). This principle leads to a contradiction analogous to the lottery paradox as we shall show.
Consider the notion of a least sufficiently warranted argument. This is an argument in which Ω is
attained exactly for all premises and inferences:
LSWA1
Ω(P1), …, Ω(Pn) (the premises are all warranted)
Ω(sat(P1,…, Pn)) (the satisfiability of the premises is warranted)
Ω(P1,…, Pn  |– Q) (the deduction is warranted)
Therefore, by WDS we have Ω(Q).
However, suppose we have not seen the following counter-argument:
LSWA2
Ω(A1), …, Ω(An) (the premises are all warranted)
Ω(sat(A1,…, An)) (the satisfiability of the premises is warranted)
Ω(A1,…, An  |–  not Q) (the deduction is warranted)
Therefore, by WDS we have Ω(not Q).
It may be that we could not find such an argument even if we looked for it. However, the possibility
of an argument of LSWA2’s form is not denied by the mere fact that we found LSWA1 first: perhaps if
we had set out to prove not Q we would have found LSWA2 first and missed LSWA1. What justifies
the “blindness” when we see that LSWA1 is valid and claim we are therefore justified in believing Q?
For example, a dishonest attempt at persuasion might avoid drawing attention to a sufficiently
warranted counter-argument that has already been made. The case where one can sense the possibility
of LSWA2, but cannot pursue the matter further is a very difficult one and not remote from everyday
life. We may feel a binary decision is forced upon us by the circumstances we are in. Thus force of
circumstances can defeat the requirement for sufficiency of warrant before action. A deconstruction of
a safety argument will look for implicit clues to uncontrolled factors, but will also try to understand the
nature of the “force” of circumstances where force majeure is explicitly claimed: for example, one can
ask how far the force of circumstances was a result of previous freely-taken decisions.
At this point a brief digression into the “postmodernist” background of our approach might help to
explain why we are so concerned with capturing the co-existence of opposing viewpoints. The
“historical turn” involved in analysing a decision in terms of the events and people that shaped it opens
onto many fascinating issues central to both deconstruction and postmodern philosophy more
generally. The postmodern perspective on discourse is that humans are impelled to construct
explanatory “narratives” that emphasise the centrality of their own viewpoint, re-assert cherished
cultural values, and rationalise changes in world-view as the perpetuation of a tradition through the
trials of experience. The narratives that different social groups construct often compete for authority
and acceptance as truth; but since each narrative is only a representation of what has happened, not the
reality, none is absolutely reliable. Many (including Derrida) claim that the postmodern perspective
does not lead to an extreme relativism in which all explanations of the past are considered equally
valid, since explanatory narratives are purposive rather than neutrally descriptive. Narratives can be
ranked according to how well they meet their intended purposes and how honestly they reveal them:
incompleteness and inaccuracy are (in theory endlessly) detectable. The “pragmatist” perspective
recognises that although we seem compelled to resolve contradictions and unify opposing perspectives,
the co-existence of contradictory narratives is more usual than logic recognises. For example, the
pragmatist would view an observation such as “Newton and Einstein cannot both be right” as
misguided absolutism and stress the usefulness of both theories, unifiable or not.
To return to our main thread, our difficulty derives from the fact that nothing in WDS  or PSW
allows us to claim that an argument of the form LSWA2 cannot exist: all inductive reasoning is
defeatable in the light of new information, which might make possible an argument of the form
LSWA2. What we call “twenty-twenty hindsight” sometimes reveals just such an argument. Whilst
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improbable. However, LSWA2  is only a schema, so there could be an infinite number of such
arguments, or none; in practice, we can at best estimate the amount of effort spent on trying to find a
counter-argument and take our assurance from how hard it is to find one. This is why DERIDASC
considered the idea of constructing the best possible counter-argument to a safety argument before
system acceptance.
We can express the dilemma of choosing between equally strong but opposing arguments more
explicitly as the decision to accept or reject the following conjecture:
Sufficient Warrant Conjecture (SWC): Ω(P) implies  not Ω( not P).
So long as we have LSWA1 and noone has found any LSWA2, we can substitute Ω(P) into  SWH in
order to state that the opposite conclusion is not sufficiently warranted: not Ω(not P). But of course this
does not mean it is unwarrantable. If someone does find LSWA2, or it exists already and we have not
seen it, they can also use SWH to argue not Ω(P) and we have a contradiction with Ω(P).
So perhaps we decide to deny SWC, so that we believe: not(Ω(P) implies  not Ω(not P)). In that
case, one can ask what interpretation should be attached to the following statements:
Insufficiency of Warrant Conjectures:
1. Ω(P) and Ω(not P) – a statement and its opposite can be sufficiently warranted
2. Ω(P) and not Ω(P) – a statement can be both sufficiently warranted and insufficiently
warranted
3. not Ω(P) and not Ω(not P) – no sufficient warrant exists for either alternative
4. Ω(P and not P) – warranted belief in contradictions (radical dialethism)
5. not Ω(P and not P) – non-belief in contradictions (the classical principle)
We do not argue for (4) here. However, logician Graham Priest (2002) does make a case for
dialethism; see Olin (2003, Chapter 2) for a critique.
We accept (5) provisionally, but show that doing so leads us to a “meta-problem” in choosing
whether to accept (2). The denial of SWC makes (1) consistent: we have to accept the possibility that a
statement and its negation can both be warranted to a sufficient degree; but suppose that we have
derived Ω(P), and act as if P. The action is an implicit appeal to SWC (which we have denied) in order
to deny (2). Do we not act as if we believe there is no equally warranted argument for Ω(not(P))?
Certainly, we can only act confidently in the belief that the sufficiency of our warrant is not defeated
even as it is asserted.
The contradiction involved in our thinking comes into sharper focus in a situation where we can
actually see an adequate counter-argument to P, and have to decide to act as if P or not P. In such a
case, we are forced to recognise (2), as it follows from (1) and (5): the “sufficient” warrant of the one
argument defeats that of the other. Since we cannot tell which argument is at fault, we have a case
where (2) seems to be true for each argument.
DERIDASC interprets this possibility as meaning that where we have equal belief in arguments for
P and for not P we have no justification for believing either (3). Unfortunately, if we were to capture
this principle in an inference rule, we create a logic that is unsound because it allows (2):
defeatability_of_warrant(dow) Ω(P) , Ω(not P)  |– not Ω(P), not Ω(not P)
So far we have assumed that we have arguments for P and not P that both meet the requirements for
sufficiency exactly. In the more usual case where one claim seems to have a higher degree of warrant
than the other, one usually chooses to act according the more warranted argument; but on what
grounds? If the “sufficient” degree of warrantedness really is sufficient for belief, then there is no
advantage to be gained from more than “sufficient” confidence; the opposed arguments should still
disqualify one another. Where we have sufficiently warranted arguments for both P and not P, as (1)
allows, then we should in practice have no confidence in either statement.
If P and not P are opposite outcomes of some type of trial, and we decide to test which argument is
correct by direct observation, then from our viewpoint and in our circumstances, the outcome is a
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arguments, then the warrant for the argument we act against is not only simultaneously sufficient and
defeatable, it is simultaneously sufficient and defeated.
For example, say we have equal warrant for heads and tails in our coin toss – the argument that P =
0.5 for both outcomes; then naturally, we can have no justified confidence that either outcome is more
likely. However, say we ended up with arguments of P = 0.6 for heads and P = 0.7 for tails, where we
needed P = 0.51 for sufficient belief. Since we have a contradiction according to probability theory and
we accept (5), the situation is no different; both arguments must be insufficient for confidence. If we
leave the matter at that, we have no warrant for predicting what the outcome will be.
In practice, other courses of action than trial might be available to us. We could appeal to factors not
covered in either argument, effectively trying to find a third which is more warranted than either of the
first two; or we could appeal for more work to be done to test one or the other argument, or both.
Nonetheless, these courses of action imply that we have invalidated the degree of sufficiency for belief
Ω. Indeed, we must invalidate it, for not to do so is to accept the justifiability of belief in contradictory
statements (4).
Thus, for any predictive argument at a particular time, if the discovery of an equally good or better
counter-argument is necessarily possible at that time, then we do not know the degree of warrant for the
argument we have: in acting on it, we merely assert belief in it. At best we can claim that we have
expended as much effort as possible on trying to find counter-arguments against our prediction and can
see no reason why it should go wrong; if noone else can either, that is the most assurance we are ever
going to get. Thus our schema illustrates that the “sufficient” level of belief we attach to a statement
retains a potential for destabilisation and is itself something that can be renegotiated in the light of
experience. This goes some way to explicating the problem behind the oft-asked question “how safe is
safe enough?” and why a definitive and context-free answer cannot be given.
It might be objected that we would avoid deriving contradictions from dow if we added a time
parameter to ω . The degree of warrant for a statement should be allowed to change over time.
Extending WDS  in this way is indeed useful because it allows one to record premises that were
warranted at a time in the past, so that we can ask whether they still are; one can also experiment with
hypothetical values or test hypothetical arguments where the warrantedness of certain premises or
deductions are not yet available. Furthermore, one can allow the level of sufficiency of warrant to
change over time; it can also be allowed to vary for different kinds of statement, since this does seem to
correspond to the way people judge claims (e.g. outlandish claims require stronger backing evidence).
Useful as these extensions might be, a simplified WDS is presented here to emphasise a point about
the performative self-contradiction inevitably involved in behaving according to arguments for
particular outcomes that are defeatable. This is not a mere matter of logic. The problem of whether
SWC  is implicitly accepted or not always recurs when we interpret a justified statement and act
according to it, leaving us vulnerable to criticism that we are behaving incoherently or in a prejudicial
manner. This is not to say that we could not expunge contradictions from our deconstructive logic.
Suppose we have a rule:
timed_dow Ωt(P, t) , Ωt(not P, t)
         |–
not Ωt+ 1(P, t + 1), not Ωt+ 1(not P, t + 1), Ωt < Ωt+ 1
This rule captures the “and you see this” caveat of DCP well. The left-hand-side of the rule will not
match unless the opposite statement has been warranted.  Where it can be warranted, the rule will
apply; and we can model the case where the level of “sufficiency” for both arguments rises as a result.
Another variation disallows the “double vision” involved in “seeing” both sides of an argument at
once:
Timed_ SWC: Ωt(P, t) implies not Ωt(not P, t) for all t
timed_dow_2 Ωt(P, t) , Ωt(not P, t + 1)
       |–
not Ωt + 2(P, t + 2), not Ω t + 2(not P, t + 2)
8warrant_induction Ωt(P, t) , not Ωt+1(not P, t+ 1)
       |–
Ω t(P, t + 1)
In this version, when a statement is warranted at t, but is “trumped” at t + 1, then we cannot tell
whether it remains warranted at t + 1. Inconsistency of warrant would be modelled consistently as an
undecidable oscillation capturing the possibility of instability we have identified. This approach might
allow us to develop a consistent logic of justified belief and we could encode whatever rules for
changes in Ω we wished; but it merely suppresses the performative contradiction involved in
“believing” the statement Ω(P, t) and acting upon it whilst allowing that it is defeatable. If sufficiency
of warrant for a statement can be determined only at a particular time, and is subject to defeat and
revision, then we never know whether the degree of “sufficient warrant” is a basis for real confidence at
a particular time. We have to accept that a statement can seem to be warranted to degree x at a
particular time, but might not actually be warranted to that degree, or indeed at all. This seems to be the
most coherent interpretation that can be made of (2); but it means that when we act upon our
arguments, we have failed to expunge unjustified beliefs from our motivations. We merely believe the
current estimate of the sufficient degree of warrant; but this is not consistent with our acceptance that
the “sufficient” degree of warrant is itself defeatable.
We can eliminate contradiction from a logic of belief, but not from our thinking when we act on
arguments for or against uncertain outcomes. For this reason, we use WDS as a scheme into which
arguments are fitted to make the implicit contradiction between probabilistic statements and proposed
actions more explicit so that we can assess the extent of the contradiction. We are not arguing that a
rational approach to risk-taking is morally unnecessary, but that rational logic is insufficient as a basis
for decision-making. Logical consistency between claim, justification, and action based upon the claim
cannot be attained where the justification is accepted as defeatable beforehand. Risk decisions are
essentially symbolic of cultural values, since such values are needed to turn mere assessments of
likelihood into support for actions.
Although anything follows from a contradiction in logic, in practice, when people act according to a
surplus of confidence they cannot rationally justify, it is not the case that anything follows. Decisions
are taken from particular viewpoints and likewise they are judged from particular viewpoints. For
example, the lottery paradox shows that logical contradictions are involved in actions that predict
winning and losing: but it is hard to imagine that someone who genuinely believed their chance of
winning to be a thousand to one against would prepare for a win with any assurance. A viewpoint can
be more or less self-assured, and its contradictions more or less apparent according to divergences of
viewpoint between the different parties. For example, if someone asserted outcome P and acted upon it
simply because they found its negation to be ludicrous, offering no other warrant, then even if we
thought their behaviour irresponsible, at least we would think of them as very sure of their own
position. However, suppose we were to detect that someone who asserts P with apparent assurance is
making strenuous behind-the-scenes efforts to establish it; in that case, we might be disturbed by the
contradiction between statement and action; but only if we ourselves were inclined to doubt P.
The degree of trust we place in someone who argues to persuade us of something is related to the
practical seriousness of flaws in their arguments, and any contradictions we detect between their
arguments and their behaviour. However, the identification of a mistake in an argument is not
sufficient for absolute dismissal of the conclusion. Dismissal on this basis would merely reassert one’s
own prior viewpoint. In fact, dismissal is not even likely: since one has to “inhabit” the argument being
put forward to understand it, there is necessary exposure of one’s own prior viewpoint to some degree
of displacement. Where we can produce equally good “for” and “against” arguments for a course of
action but cannot see which is the more believable, both arguments are (if temporarily) dismissed by
any principle of sufficiency of belief we may have; so we would need to revise our idea of what level
of justification is sufficient for confidence from our new viewpoint and ask the original question again.
In a dilemma, force of circumstances is often offered as a justification for following a certain course
of action. Such assertions need to be considered carefully. We can ask the following questions:
a) How does a party (perhaps ourselves) represent the circumstances they are in to themselves?
b) Is the representation accurate, e.g. does it symbolise hidden value systems, emphasise certain
interests and de-emphasise or exclude others?
9c) When they act, does a party use political power to change the circumstances whilst arguing
that they are subject to them?
These are key themes of postmodern philosophy and questions that might help safety assessors
understand the “safety culture” of an organisation that puts a safety-critical system up for acceptance.
However, they are also questions that assessors should ask of themselves, since to ask a), b) and c)
at all presupposes a viewpoint that differs from the viewpoint being assessed.
4. Deconstructive Argument Reversal
The safety argument deconstructor proceeds by interpreting the meta-argument in SA as a circular
argument. The hypothesis is that the arguer proceeded as follows:
“My goal is to establish conclusion C. Therefore, my task is to find warranted assertions Ω( P1),…,
Ω( Pn) that imply C. Since C is the conclusion I require, I will exclude any warrantable assertions that
contradict any of P1,…, Pn.”
However, we need not impute these motives to the arguer. The deconstructor merely plays Devil’s
Advocate by interpreting SA as follows:
“I assert that C must be false. From the assumption of not C and the fact that SA is deductively
valid, it must be that not(P1,…, Pn) – i.e. at least one of the premises must be false. I will therefore try
to show Ω( not(P1,…, Pn) ), either by showing these premises to be mutually inconsistent, or by finding
statements Ω(R1),…, Ω(Rm) so that I can make the counter-argument:
CA  Ω( R1),…, Ω( Rm) |–  Ω( not C)
The deconstructor must try to attain the same standards of sufficiency of warrant as SA: so for
example, the same deduction techniques and method of argument presentation could be used. Note that
a counter-argument, if one can be found, also makes use of SDCP to infer the warrantability of the
falsity of C from the premises. In applying SDCP, the reversal stage of deconstruction involves
“repeating the original mistake” of asserting closure (as deconstruction sees it). The problem as we see
it is that the safety acceptance criteria are being tested both when a system is subjected to them and
also afterward when it is used and its actual safety observed. Safety arguments rarely claim a complete
absence of risk because the acceptance criteria they meet could be proved inadequate in practice.
5. The Need for Deconstructive Argument Displacement
The safety process sometimes involves arguments about the acceptability of acceptance criteria as
well as the adherence of a system to prearranged acceptance criteria. The best case is that the reversal
stage fails to produce a convincing counter-argument; in this case, both supplier and assessor will most
likely agree that the certification of the system is warranted and displacement becomes a trivial matter.
Changes to the acceptance criteria are not needed in such cases; but our worst-case scenario (formally
“warranted” incompatibles) seems to require that displacement also answer the question of how the
acceptance criteria should be evolved – a task that is itself not guaranteed to improve matters.
Differing viewpoints, competing interests, and changes in circumstances only complicate the
problem. Our worst-case scenario, as uncommon as it might be, is disorienting for all concerned.
Common agreement might evade concerned parties: for example, the failure to find a good counter-
argument might not be total. Furthermore, even in the best case, the question of why submission to the
test of experience was accepted precisely when it was may arise later if safety problems do occur.
A similar point was made by Vesely, and is quoted in Leveson (1995, p.167). In this case, the issue
is where to draw the boundary to a hazardous system. Suppose we assess the probability of an included
hazard as 10-3, and take steps to reduce it – say to 10-6. Suppose that for whatever reason we omit a
hazard with probability 10-4; thus 10-6 is a serious overestimate of the reliability of our system. As
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deconstruction suggests, the meaning of our claims is ironically enough, a function of what we exclude
from them and when we choose to make them.
An analogous argument can be made about observations that could threaten the warrant for a
particular premise. If “warrant” is relative to how much justificatory work is undertaken then one could
theoretically work on the warrant for a particular statement forever. This fact makes possible a politics
of “creative inertia”: the supplier of SA, being initially intrigued by CA, might agree that CA seems to
be a strong counter-argument; but they might then argue that the warrant of one of its statements – say
Rj – needs more work. The supplier of CA might agree; but they could also object that one of the
premises of SA – say Pi – also needs more work, and so forth.
Our suggestion has been that should a reversal succeed well enough to cause a deadlock situation
then neither argument should be considered valid. Otherwise, the only way to break a deadlock in the
dialectic process is through an action that implicitly subordinates one argument to the other. Where
there are equally plausible arguments for opposite outcomes, involved parties sometimes cannot see
any other option but to make the test of experience. However, this is not necessarily to act in a way that
is justified: there must be some at least implicit appeal to other values. For example, rationally
unjustified action is often symbolic of cultural values, asserted authority, and claims to expertise, as
Clarke (1999) argues in relation to certain infeasible plans for “managing” unprecedented disasters.
Safety processes use cost-benefit analysis to avoid political deadlocks; unfortunately, it is still
possible to construct a situation in which the benefits and costs are equally balanced, since benefits to
some can be costs to others. The opposing power differentials implicit in the principles of “willingness
to pay” and “willingness to accept” principles have already been recognised (Adams 1995).
To describe the deadlock situation we need not only the argument for a positive outcome and the
counter-argument for a negative outcome but also two implicit propositions:
1. SA an argument for doing action a
2. CA an argument against doing action a (by doing not a)
3. SA should be accepted now, i.e. we should test C/not C by experience by doing a
4. CA should be accepted now, i.e. we should do not a and not test C/not C
It is possible that a “battle of wills” might well ensue: case (3) might be adopted in order to defeat
CA as a matter of exigency, thus attracting no criticism; but (3) could also be enforced by one party on
the other. Thus at the point at which SA is given priority over CA, CA is in effect given no priority,
whatever steps have been taken against the failure of C. If there are no further steps that can be taken
against the failure of C we have a necessary possibility of not C: and if this possibility is actualised, CA
will come back to haunt the proposer of SA.
Furthermore, (4) need consist only of a plea for more evidence short of testing C. This might also be
a matter of enforcement: for example, (4) can be used as a delaying tactic to defeat (eventually) SA by
“putting off the evil day” until the proposer of SA either loses interest or runs out of resources to do a.
Unsurprisingly, a deadlock situation is prone to make explicit any underlying power struggles: but
we can only make sense of the situation through explicit co-operation, attempts to understand
viewpoints that differ from our own, and exposure of our own viewpoint to analysis and criticism. To
make sense of the political controversy and hopefully avoid wasteful argument, the displacement stage
must consider what factors in addition to their belief in their proffered arguments parties might have
for whichever of proposition (3) or (4) they favour.
Such factors are likely to be operating because in the absence of other implicit considerations,
circular reasoning would be involved in the justification of both courses of action: to do action a is to
commit to (3), which presupposes SA; to “do” not a and commit to (4) presupposes CA. Both parties
must be acting according to preferences and interests not made explicit in their arguments. We do not
see a deadlock situation settled by power differentials as a “win” for the safety process as a whole; in a
sense, all parties lose, since the acceptance criteria have in fact entirely failed. New acceptance criteria
are needed: and if there is disagreement about why the process is deadlocked, implicit acceptance
criteria are already being applied by one party or the other. Trying to make these criteria explicit,
should it prove necessary, will probably be the most difficult and protracted part of the displacement
stage.
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6. An Example: The Goal Structuring Notation
The hypothetical example deconstruction in this section is done in the Goal Structuring Notation
(GSN) and is adapted from Kelly (1998). The example argues a sufficiency of protection against a risk
of catastrophic failure. In the source text, the example is only part of a larger GSN argument and thus
some of the questions we put are answered there or are not relevant. We have taken the example out of
its original context to illustrate the process of deconstruction.
GSN is intended to make the structure of arguments clearer than free text does and thus provides a
neutral and convenient format for the construction of safety counter-arguments. The notation provides:
− Goals (best expressed as predicates)
− Goal Decomposition (top down)
− Strategies (for explaining goal decompositions)
− Solutions (direct information sources)
− Justifications (for explaining rationale)
− Assumptions
G1 Risk of intolerable
platform failure is
sufficiently low
(Quantitative)
G2 Random failure rate
contributions to intolerable
platform failure are
sufficiently low
G3 Systematic error
contribution to intolerable
platform failure is
sufficiently low
G4 Tools, techniques and
methods were used
appropriate to the severity of
identified failures
G5 System developed to
Development Assurance
Level A process guidelines
J1
Development Assurance
Level A appropriate for
systems whose
consequences of failure
would be catastrophic
C3
Random failure
contributions (and
budgets) determined
through Fault Tree
Analysis of top event
“Catastrophic Failure”
C1
“Sufficient” =
platform meets target
failure rate of 1 X 10-6
per flight hour
C2
“Intolerable Platform Failure”
= omission, commission, value
or timing failure of control
output
C4
Worst case severity
associated with
consequences of
platform failure
assessed as
catastrophic
G6 Component Reliability
targets shown to be met by
Component FMEA tables
Fig. 1. GSN Example
There are also links to information and factors outside the scope of the argument itself: Contexts (for
describing the circumstances of the argument), and links to Models of a system. Hence it is a simple
matter to define a “shadow” GSN that provides a starting point for the construction of counter-
arguments:
− Anti-goals (negations of the stated goals)
− Anti-goal Deconstruction (questioning the verifiability of a goal, the consistency between its anti-
goal and stated subgoals, and the mutual independence of subgoals)
− Tactics (unexplained manoeuvres in goal decomposition)
− Questions (to be placed against solutions)
− Presuppositions (unexplained rationale behind justifications)
− Denials (negations of assumed facts)
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In the reversal stage, context and links to system models should be taken as givens. However, during
displacement, if a counter-argument proves fruitful, the context in which it is stated may diverge in
important ways from the original and this should be recorded.
6.1. Reversal
Given that the meanings of “sufficient” and “intolerable platform failure” are made clear in Fig 1,
the negation of the top-level goal G1 to give an anti-goal is trivial. Looking at the decomposition of G1
we can see that the argument depends upon a distinction between random and systematic failure
contributions, but this distinction is left unexplained. The deconstructor would hypothesize the absence
of any explanatory strategy as an argumentative tactic. The way in which the two rates have been
combined in the example is not clarified: one can ask for example whether, in order to get random
failure rates sufficiently low, the design has not used a complex scheme for redundancy that has made
systematic errors more likely.
Furthermore, the distinction between “random” and “systematic” failures can be questioned. For
example, “random” failure rates for hardware vary with intended operating conditions and it could be
that Fault Tree Analysis (C3) has not taken account of this.
Fig. 2. Example GSN Counter-argument
For “systematic” failure rates the chain of goals G3-G4-G5 could indicate flawed reasoning. For
example, the negation of G3 is not in contradiction with G4. A presupposition behind J1 is that
Development Assurance Level A and its associated tools, techniques and methods are “appropriate” for
systems whose consequences of failure would be catastrophic. This most likely means that Level A
development is required where failure is catastrophic; but it probably does not mean that adherence to
Level A is considered sufficient to bound the predicted rate of systematic failure, or that the prediction
must remain below any specific threshold of acceptability. Still less can a process be expected to bound
the measured rate of catastrophic failure, as this is dependent upon the level of exposure to the system
and its hazards that is accepted.
AG1 Predicted risk of
intolerable platform
failure rate is not
quantitatively reliable
AG2 Random failure rate
contributions to intolerable
failure dependent on operating
environment conditions
AG3 Estimated systematic
error contribution to
intolerable platform failure
is unspecified
AG4 Use of appropriate
tools, techniques and
methods insufficient to
bound rate of unidentified
systematic failures
AG5 System not developed
to Development Assurance
Level A process guidelines
P(J1)
Adherence to Development
Assurance Level A
recognised to be insufficient
to bound predicted failure
rates: experience shows
predictions bounded to
within x of actual on
average
C3
Random failure
contributions (and
budgets) determined
through Fault Tree
Analysis of top event
“Catastrophic Failure”
C1
“Sufficient” =
platform meets target
failure rate of 1 X 10-6
per flight hour
C2
“Intolerable Platform Failure”
= omission, commission, value
or timing failure of control
output
C4
Worst case severity
associated with
consequences of
platform failure
assessed as
catastrophic
AG6 Component FMEA table
predictions assume standard
operating conditions
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The example argument omits system and environment models from which systematic failure rate
predictions must be derived. Instead, it argues that a Level A development process is commensurate
with an acceptable systematic failure contribution. However, the best contribution that a development
process can make to a systematic failure rate prediction is assurance that it provides the right context
for the detection of unreliable systematic failure predictions: historically, it should have supported the
derivation of reliable predictions, whatever those predictions might have been. Assuming this to be the
case, the argument remains incomplete without the models that justify a specific predicted figure.
We can also speculate that justification J1 would be especially fallacious if the definition of
Development Assurance Level A recognised that its tools and techniques – while appropriate for
handling catastrophic hazards – were insufficient for the attainment of definite systematic failure rates.
In such a case, the goal chain G3-G4-G5 would constitute a non-compliance with Level A and we
might consider the argument to be a performative self-contradiction (a non-compliant statement of
compliance).
Such questions lead to the counter-argument in Fig 2.
6.2. Displacement
The original GSN argument would be considerably improved by:
− The addition of a specific systematic failure contribution estimate
− Linking in system specification, test evidence, and hazard models as solution evidence for the
systematic failure prediction G3
− Adding a strategy showing how the systematic failure rates were combined with the random failure
estimate to give G1
− Stressing that goals G1 and G2 are only predicted failure rates in their text
− Making G5 part of the context of G1
− Combining G4 and J1 into a justification of the systematic failure rate prediction (by attachment to
the modified G3)
A general conclusion that emerges from the deconstruction is that even when a top-level safety goal
is clearly stated, the conditions of its verifiability might presuppose the acceptance that is supposedly
being asked for. Evidently no analysis can predetermine a predicted rate as equal to the measured rate;
system acceptance is a condition for verifying such a prediction. Thus when a` predicted catastrophic
failure rate of 10-6 is set as a “goal”, there is a risk that the safety argument focuses solely on finding a
way of expressing the required prediction. The problem with our example argument is that only goals
G2 and G4 can be reasonably considered verifiable before acceptance, whereas G1 and G2 and G3
have to be understood as predictions that could be verified only after a presupposed acceptance.
Such goals might be better thought of as conditions for continued system acceptability: for example,
the system could be temporarily withdrawn for modification if the failure rate ever exceeded the
predicted rate. However, it is sometimes the case that a system is withdrawn for modification as soon
as it fails catastrophically within the predicted rate, or even after a “near-miss”. There seems to be an
implicit distinction between the acceptability of a predicted rate of catastrophic failure and the
acceptability of a near-miss or an actual catastrophic failure, even where the rate prediction admits
these possibilities. Put simply, we accept abstract and idealised dangers as they are predicted in safety
arguments more readily than we accept the empirical prospect of danger or its actual consequences.
In this case, predictions of catastrophic failure rate are best seen as a basis for assessing and
controlling exposure to danger, so that “over-egging” the predictive power of a development process is
to be avoided. Since no development process could be shown to bound measured systematic failure
rates without reference to a specification (which determines which behaviours are considered as
failures) and since the process arguably limits the reliability of predicted failure rates, to do so might
breed false confidence on all sides.
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Future Work
The DERIDASC project did not set out to assess the advantages and disadvantages of our approach
in industrial practice: we felt that experimentation with an immature method might prove obstructive.
However, our experimental applications of the Warranted Deduction Schema to example safety
arguments suggested the following benefits:
− an approach to safety assessment that is more visibly adversarial, leading to the construction of
better safety arguments
− more reliable and unambiguous rejection of unsatisfactory safety arguments
− the ability to monitor the effect of new information and knowledge on accepted safety arguments
− a “ready made” assessment approach for different safety argument notations (through the definition
of accompanying “shadow” notations)
− a method by which regulators can explicitly manage the incorporation, comparison, and assessment
of different viewpoints on the safety of a system, including arguments addressed to the lay public
from differing viewpoints
− a way of explaining the evolution of safety acceptance criteria to the public
More substantive testing of safety argument deconstruction in an industrial context could be carried
out on several published safety cases that we have already looked at. The issues to be addressed are:
− are “in-house” counter-arguments an effective way for suppliers to identify and remedy objections
before regulatory assessment takes place?
− what resources need to be set aside for the production of counter-arguments?
− would through-life counter-argument maintenance be cost-effective?
− is public trust enhanced by the explicitly adversarial nature of the approach?
A key question about our adversarial approach is whether it will really prove resistant to the
production pressures, unimaginative complacency, and excessive bureaucracy that are generally
alleged as the root causes of safety failure. A fascinating and perhaps morally necessary deconstructive
exercise would be to apply our strategy to itself, that is, to our own justification for it, in collaboration
with independent colleagues.
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